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Corporate Homicide: A New Assault on
Corporate Decision-making
I. Introduction
On September 13, 1978, an Elkhart County, Indiana, grand jury indicted
the Ford Motor Company (Ford).' Although this event hardly seems monu-
mental, it represents a rare occurrence in the American criminal process. Ford
was not charged with a regulatory infraction, as might have been expected,
but with three counts of reckless homicide.2
The indictment followed the grand jury's investigation of an August 10,
1978, traffc accident involving a Pinto automobile. Ford was charged with
recklessly designing and manufacturing a 1973 Pinto and allowing the vehicle to
remain on the public highway The faulty design and manufacture of the car
were alleged to have caused the Pinto to explode upon rear-end impact, resulting
in the death of its three occupants.4 Thus, an event that would normally be
resolved by civil litigation in the form of a products liability suit was found to
involve such a substantial deviation from the conduct required of an automobile
manufacturer as to warrant a prosecution for reckless homicide.
The "Pinto case" may mark the beginning of a new assault on corporate
decision-making. Corporations might have to reconsider company policies con-
cerning compliance with federal safety standards, cost analysis, and corporate
response to products found to be defectively designed after they have reached
the consumer market if they are to avoid the consequences of a criminal con-
viction.5 The use of a state's general criminal statutes to refine corporate con-
sciousness for consumer safety, however, raises a fundamental legal issue: can a
corporation be held criminally liable for homicide?
The purpose of this note is to discuss this issue in the context of the Pinto
case and to focus upon whether prosecutions of this nature are legally permis-
sible and practicably desirable. Although the matter will ultimately be resolved
in the courts, the uniqueness of the prosecution and its potential impact on the
corporate environment makes pre-judicial consideration worthwhile. Indeed,
the Pinto case inevitably has caused concern among industrial leaders as to the
potential stigma of a criminal conviction following the marketing of a defective
product.
II. Corporate Liability for Homicide-A Trend Without a Rule
A. Historical Perspective
At common law a corporation could not commit a crime.6 This position
I State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Indiana Super. Ct., filed Sept. 13, 1978). The
court hearing the case sits in Elkhart County.
2 Ford was also charged with one count of criminal recklessness, but that charge was later
dropped at the request of the prosecutor.
3 State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Indictment at 1).
4 Id.
5 See text accompanying note 95 infra.
6 See generally 10 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 4942, at 620 (1978);
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was predicated on the rationale that a corporation had no mind and hence could
not entertain the appropriate criminal intent required for all common law
crimes.' Also, the absence of a physical body precluded imprisonment, the
primary punishment available at common law. Illegal acts of a corporate agent
were not imputed to the corporate entity because they were considered ultra
vires and therefore without the authority of the corporation.
The growth of the corporation as a dominant factor in American business,
however, resulted in the demise of corporate immunity. Inroads were made by
prosecuting corporations for nonfeasance and regulatory offenses.8 The modern
view that a corporation could be held criminally liable for the acts and omis-
sions of its agents was adopted in the landmark case of New York Central Rail-
road v. United States.9 In upholding a conviction under the Elkins Act" for vio-
lating a rate provision, the Supreme Court stated: "We see no good reason why
corporations may not be held responsible for and charged with the knowledge
and purposes of their agents, acting within the authority conferred upon them.""
Although both the federal government and the states were quick to extend
criminal liability to the corporate entity,12 the extension has not encompassed
liability for all crimes. The Supreme Court recognized this proposition in New
York Central Railroad when it stated: "[i]t is true that there are some crimes,
which in their nature cannot be committed by corporations."'" Generally,
whether a corporation is subject to criminal liability under a given statute is
determined by the nature of the offense and the perceived legislative intent for
promulgating the law. 4
B. Homicide-A Problem of Semantics
Corporate criminal liability for homicide is an enigmatic concept. The
ambiguity stems from two factors: the definition of homicide and the infrequency
of criminal prosecutions against corporations for the offense. Although every
state has statutorily attempted to deal with the problem of corporate criminal
liability,"5 such statutes often do little more than state that corporations are gen-
erally subject to the criminal law.'0 The applicability of particular offenses to
corporations, however, is frequently less than obvious.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the association of the corporate entity with
HENN CORPORATIONS § 186 (1961); W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW * 33 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as LAFAVE & SCOTT].
7 LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 6, at 228.
8 Id. at 229. See, e.g., New York & G.L.R. Co. v. State, 50 N.J.L. 303, 13 A. 1 (1888);
People v. Clark, 8 Crim. Ct. N.Y. 169, 14 N.Y.S. 642 (1891).
9 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
10 49 U.S.C. §§ 41-43 (1970).
11 212 U.S. at 494-95.
12 See generally Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky.
L.J. 73 (1976-77); 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (here "person" was defined so as to include corpora-
tions throughout the United States CODE).
13 212 U.S. at 494.
14 LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 6, at 229-30.
15 Coleman, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, 29 Sw.L.J. 908, 912
(1975-76).
16 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-41-2-3 (Supp. 1978).
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the concept of homicide is the generic nature of the term. Homicide describes
the "killing of a human being caused by a human being."17 Most state statutes
incorporate this definition in some form when articulating a homicide offense.
The requirement that the actor be human is precisely what has precluded corpo-
rate liability in the past. When confronted with potential corporate liability for
homicide, courts have focused on the requirement that the actor be human and
have taken great pains to determine whether a corporation can be held liable
within the definition of the offense. Their answers have not been consistent, but
evince a trend toward subjecting corporations to liability under homicide stat-
utes.
C. Homicide in the Courts
United States v. Van Schaick'8 was one of the first recorded cases to con-
front the issue of corporate liability for homicide. The Van Schaick court held
that a corporation which failed to provide adequate life preservers on one of its
steamships could be guilty of manslaughter under a statute which provided that
"every owner ... through whose fraud, connivance, misconduct or violation of
the law the life of any person is destroyed shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter
and upon conviction therefor shall be sentenced to confinement at hard labor."19
Significantly, the Van Schaick court stated that the absence of an appropriate
punishment did not bar liability,2" because the omission was indicative of a
congressional oversight and not an intention to immunize corporations under the
statute." In this manner, the Van Schaick court rejected a traditional barrier to
criminal prosecution under criminal statutes, namely, the absence of an appro-
priate penalty.
New York courts first recognized corporate liability for homicide in People
v. Rochester Railway & Light Co.2  The Rochester Railway court drew a strong
analogy to civil proceedings in which corporations had to answer for the conduct
of their agents acting within the scope of corporate authority.2" The Rochester
Railway court endorsed the theory that since "a corporation acts by its officers
and agents, their purposes, motives, and intent are just as much those of the
corporation as are the things done."2 4 Thus, the court apparently accepted the
theory that a corporation could commit manslaughter. The indictment was
dismissed, however, because under the relevant statute, homicide was defined as
"the killing of one human being by the act, procurement or omission of
another."2 The Rochester Railway court found that use of the word "another"
in this context limited liability for the offense to human beings. Accordingly, the
17 W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, CRIMES 597 (7th ed. 1967). Some commentators argue
that since corporations can act only through human beings, the definition does not present a
barrier to prosecuting corporations. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 6, at 230.
18 134 F. 592 (1904).
19 Rev. St. U.S. § 5344 (2d ed. 1873); U.S. Comp. St. 1901 at 3629 (1901).
20 134 F. at 602.
21 Id.
22 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909).
23 Id. at 104, 88 N.E. at 23.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 107, 88 N.E. at 24.
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prosecution's contention that "another" meant a "person" (and therefore a
corporation) was rejected.26
The Rochester Railway case demonstrates the dilemma that ensues when a
state's homicide statutes are applied to corporate entities. Legislative intent is
difficult to discern when common law definitions are summarily employed in
formulating homicide statutes. Thus, absent an expression of some legislative
intent to create criminal liability, judicial attempts to remove corporate immunity
are easily frustrated.
The semantic obstacle inherent in the concept of "corporate" homicide also
prevented prosecution in Commonwealth v. Illinios Central Railroad Co., 7 in
which a corporation was indicted for involuntary manslaughter following a train
accident which resulted in the death of a passenger. The prosecution charged
that the railroad had operated the train with "gross and willful negligence" at an
unreasonable speed,"8 thus causing the fatal accident. In analyzing the validity
of the indictment, the Illinois Central court noted that manslaughter was not
defined by statute in Kentucky. Hence, the court applied the appropriate state
common law definition: "Involuntary manslaughter is the killing by one person
of another person in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony, nor
likely to endanger life, and without an intention to kill; or where one kills another
while doing a lawful act in an unlawful manner."29  Acknowledging that
Kentucky statutory law extended the term "person" to include corporations,
the Illinois Central court nevertheless rejected the contention that a corporation
could commit homicide." The court relied on the fact that the standard defini-
tion of homicide required the killing of one human being by "another" human
being. According to the court, "in a case of homicide, though it be involuntary
manslaughter, it would, we think, be giving the word 'person' a tortured meaning
to say that it includes a corporation."' 1 The court found that the use of "another"
in the definition of involuntary manslaughter required the slayer and victim to
be of the same class. Although a corporation was a person in law, the court held
that it was still an artificial person, and therefore distinct from the victim, a
human being.
Thus, the Illinois Central and Rochester Railway courts both denied corpo-
rate liability while manifesting a philosophical difference regarding the ultimate
issue, corporate criminal liability for homicide. The Illinois Central court found
the two concepts to be theoretically incompatible, while the Rochester Railway
court accepted the plausibility of corporate criminal liability for homicide, but
denied responsibility under the relevant statute. These two cases represent the
theoretical and statutory barriers that have prohibited corporate prosecutions for
criminal homicide. Notwithstanding the final holding of Rochester Railway,
the court's willingness to accept the theoretical compatibility of criminal homicide
and the modern corporate entity established important dictum for later prosecu-
tions.
26 Id.
27 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459 (1913).
28 Id. at 321, 153 S.W. at 460.
29 Id. at 324, 153 S.W. at 461.
30 Id. at 325, 153 S.W. at 461.
31 Id. at 325, 153 S.W. at 462.
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State v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. 2 was one of the first cases to sustain
an indictment returned against a corporate defendant for criminal homicide. In
upholding the indictment, the Lehigh Valley court recognized the growing trend
to make corporations subject to the general criminal law, even at the expense of
logic. The Lehigh Valley court explained:
We need not consider whether the modification of the common law by our
decisions is to be justified by logical argument; it is confessedly a departure
at least from the broad language in which the earlier definitions were stated,
and a departure made necessary by changed conditions if the criminal law
was not to be set at naught in many cases, by contriving that the criminal
act should be in law the act of a corporation.
33
Ultimately, the court reasoned, a corporation should be accountable under the
criminal law unless something in the nature of the offense, the penalty provided,
or the essential elements would render corporate culpability impossible. 4
The Lehigh Valley court had little difficulty entertaining the view that a
corporation could be criminally liable for its own negligence under a man-
slaughter statute. In dealing with the traditional definition of homicide as the
killing of one human being by another human being, the court noted that numer-
ous definitions of homicide had been promulgated. 5 Thus, the Lehigh Valley
court rejected the traditional definition, refusing to be constrained by what it
thought to be an arbitrary concept of homicide, namely, that a human being
must be killed by another human being.
The Lehigh Valley court also rejected the Rochester Railway holding. Con-
cluding that Rochester Railway was based on the precise language of a statute
which adopted a "traditional" definition of homicide, the court summarily dis-
missed the relevance of the case.3 In Lehigh Valley, however, it was noted that
the Rochester Railway court went to "some pains to show that there was nothing
essentially incongruous in holding a corporation aggregate criminally liable for
manslaughter."3 7 The Lehigh Valley court also dismissed the holding- of Illinois
Central on the ground that it was premised "on an inaccurate definition of
homicide."3 8 Thus, both the Rochester Railway and Illinois Central problems
were resolved by adopting a more flexible definition of homicide.
In essence, Lehigh Valley was not willing to frustrate the adaptation of the
criminal law to prevailing social realities. The court refused to recognize arti-
ficially created conceptual barriers founded on theoretical objections and statu-
tory construction. This position was articulated in the Lehigh Valley court's
critique of Rochester Railway:
32 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917).
33 Id. at 373, 103 A. at 685.
34 The court suggested that a corporation could not be prosecuted for perjury, treason,
murder or any crime requiring a "corrupt intent or malus animus." Id.
35 The court cited Blackstone's definition as one example: "the killing of a human creature,
of any age or sex, without justification or excuse." Blackstone included suicide within this
definition, which the court found to preclude the restriction of one human being killing an-
other. Hence, the Lehigh Valley court considered corporate homicide consistent with Black-
stone's definition. Id. at 375, 103 A. at 686.
36 Id. at 375-76, 103 A. at 686.
37 Id. at 376, 103 A. at 686.
38 Id.
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The case is a good illustration of the way in which the proper growth and
development of the law can be prevented by the hard and fast language of
a statute, and of the advantage of our own legal system by which the way is
open for a court to do justice by the proper application of legal principles. 39
The New York courts did not reconsider the Rochester Railway rule until
1974. In People v. Ebasco Services, Inc.,4" a corporation was charged with
negligent homicide when a cofferdam collapsed killing two workmen engaged in
construction work on a river bottom. The defendant corporation attacked the
indictment claiming that a corporation could not be indicted for criminally
negligent homicide. The court responded by ruling that Rochester Railway had
established precedent for the concept of corporate culpability for homicide.4 '
In explaining the dismissal of the indictment in Rochester Railway, the
Ebasco court noted that the Rochester Railway result hinged on a question of
legislative intent. Thus, the validity of the indictment in Ebasco was dependent
upon whether the legislature intended the negligent homicide statute to apply to
corporations. Accordingly, to resolve the matter the court turned to the language
of the statutes involved.
The relevant statute stated: "A person is guilty of criminally negligent homi-
cide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person."4 2
The homicide article of the New York Penal Code defined person as follows:
" 'Person,' when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human being who
has been born and is alive." 3 The defendant asserted that the limitation of the
word "person" to human beings applied to all uses of the term within the homi-
cide definition, including the party liable for the death. Noting that this con-
clusion contradicted the definitoin on its face, the Ebasco court stated that the
limitation applied only when "person" referred to the victim. The Ebasco
opinion, moreover, indicated that the only purpose of this limitation was to
exclude abortional killings from the definition of homicide.44
Finding a definition of "person" absent in the homicide article, the court
employed the broader meaning supplied in the general definitional article of the
penal code:" 'Person' means a human being, and where appropriate, a public or
private corporation .... 4  The Ebasco court concluded that since Rochester
Railway authorized the legislature to subject corporate entities to criminal liabil-
ity for homicide, there was no manifest impropriety in applying the broader
definition of "person.6
Lehigh Valley and Ebasco demonstrate an increasing judicial willingness to
39 Id.
40 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1974).
41 Id., 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra for the Rochester
proposition.
42 Id. at 786, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
43 Id. (emphasis by the court).
44 Id. at 787, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11.
45 Id., 354 N.Y.S.2d 811.
46 Id. This approach actually begs the question. Since "person" includes corporations
only "where appropriate," the question is whether the legislature intended the homicide statute
to apply to corporations. Rochester Railway's dicta extending liability for homicide to corpora-
tions does not mean that such liability was in fact created by the statute. See text accompany-
ing notes 51-54 infra.
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impose criminal liability on corporations for homicide. Although the common
law treatment of corporations under the criminal law and the intangible nature
of the corporate entity have presented theoretical and conceptual problems for
some courts, their influence is waning. Given the ubiquitous nature of corpora-
tions in our society, economic and social considerations have preempted the im-
portance of anachronistic theories and conceptual consistency. This does not,
however, resolve the issue completely since a definitive rule has yet to be pro-
duced. The absence of both judicial consideration and legislative guidance in
many states suggests that uniform treatment regarding the compatibility of
criminal homicide and the corporate entity must await future development.
Although jurisprudential assaults upon the concept of criminal liability con-
tinue,4 7 statutory obstacles remain the primary concern. Thus, consideration of
normal statutory frameworks is appropriate. The Model Penal Code provides a
good vehicle for such an examination.
III. The Model Penal Code and Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide
The American Law Institute has given lengthy consideration to the topic of
corporate criminal liability in its Model Penal Code. Generally, the Code would
subject a corporation to criminal liability if: (1) a particular statute expresses
the legislature's desire to include corporations, (2) the illegal act is performed
by a corporate agent acting within the scope of his employment, and (3) the
criminal act is performed for the benefit of the corporation."8 Criminal respon-
sibility would also attach when the offense was premised upon the failure to
perform a duty imposed on corporations by law, or when the offense involved
the acquiescence of the board of directors or a high-level manager acting in
behalf of the corporation and within the scope of his employment. 9
When corporate criminal liability for homicide is analyzed under the
Model Penal Code, the typical problems of statutory construction become ap-
parent. According to the Code: "a person is guilty of criminal homicide if he
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human
being."5" The problems present in Rochester Railway have not been eliminated.
Thus, clarification of key statutory words is necessary.
The critical terms in the Model Penal Code provision are "person" "human
being" and "another." The criminal homicide article defines "human being"
as "a person who has been born and is alive."'" Accordingly, the term "human
being" excludes corporations. Significantly, the homicide article does not provide
a definition for the word "person," and therefore the Code's general definitions
must be consulted. According to § 1.13(8): "'person,' . . . include(s) any
natural person and, where relevant, a corporation, or an unincorporated associ-
ation." Again ambiguity surfaces. The definition of "person" limits the in-
47 See generally Coleman, supra note 15; Elkins, supra note 12.
48 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (1) (a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
49 Id. at § 2.07(1) (h) & (c).
50 Id. at § 210.1(1) (emphasis added).
51 Id. at § 210.0(1).
52 Id. at § 1.13(8).
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clusion of corporations to situations "where relevant." 3 The Code's general
provision regarding corporate criminal liability54 can be used as a guide in deter-
mining relevancy but ultimately the matter must be resolved by legislative in-
tent.
The best indication of the intent of the Code's drafters can be found in the
comments to the Tentative Drafts." The Code's authors acknowledge in these
comments that corporate criminal liability is a modern development which "has
proceeded largely without reference to any intelligible body of principle."5 "
Recognizing this fact, the drafters attempted to provide general guidance on the
subject. The basic principle advocated by the Code is the doctrine of respondeat
superior, qualified by the requirement that the agent's conduct be performed "in
behalf of the corporation." 57 Thus, under certain conditions a corporation can
be held criminally responsible for a homicide committed by a corporate agent.
The drafters, however, after considering that shareholders ultimately bear the
burden of corporate criminal liability," suggested that corporate criminal sanc-
tions be withheld from "serious crimes.""5 What little guidance is offered by this
comment is additionally compromised by the statement: "There are considera-
tions, however, which indicate the prudence of retaining responsibility on a more
restricted basis for [serious] crimes."6 The drafters also failed to distinguish
which crimes are "serious crimes."
The Model Penal Code, like most criminal codes, fails, by its language
alone, to resolve the ambiguity surrounding corporate criminal liability for homi-
cide. The absence of substantial case law adds further confusion. Although some
commentators endorse the compatibility of homicide and corporate criminal
liability, 1 the courts are bound to resolve the inherent statutory ambiguities
in terms of legislative intent. Paradoxically, the ambiguity found in penal codes
subjects the issue to judicial resolution without legislative guidance.62
Although the comments to the Model Penal Code do not expressly address
the issue of corporate criminal responsibility for homicide, some indication exists
that the drafters favor liability. The drafters note that corporate criminal liabil-
ity for common law offenses has been a rare occurrence in the American criminal
process. 3 They enumerate several offenses, however, which have resulted in
criminal responsibility, including involuntary manslaughter. 4 The recognition
of such prosecutions might be an implicit acceptance of the procedure. A con-
tradictory argument, however, is suggested by the Tentative Draft's observation
53 The problem is similar to the dilemma that confronted the Ebasco court. See text
accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
54 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (1) (a)-(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
55 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment (Tent..Draft No. 4, 1955).
56 Id. at 146.
57 Id. at 147. The Tentative Draft of § 2.07 was adopted in the Proposed Official Draft
with minor modifications.
58 See text accompanying note 83 infra for a discussion of the ultimate responsibility for cor-
porate criminal infractions.
59 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 55, at 150.
60 Id.
61 See LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 6, at 230.
62 Given the current judicial trend to erode corporate immunity in general, liability is
probable.
63 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 55, at 150.
64 Id.
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that tort liability is often more prophylactic than criminal liability"5 since the
monetary burden is substantially greater. Thus, no reliable legislative intent can
be discerned.
The Indiana courts will confront similar statutory ambiguities in resolving
the Pinto case. Thus, the validity of the Ford prosecution will require a critical
analysis of the Indiana Penal Code and the precise language employed in the
homicide statute.
IV. The Pinto Case-What Did the Legislature Really Intend?
A. The Statutory Setting
The validity of the Ford indictment under Indiana law turns on the stat-
utory definition of reckless homicide, "[a] person who recklessly kills another
human being commits reckless homicide. . . ."" The problems faced in
Rochester Railway, Illinois Central, and Ebasco are present under such a stat-
utory provision. The use of the word "another" appears to limit "person" to
human beings. Hence, the statute could be read so as to preclude corporate
liability.
A contrary result is suggested, however, when the statute is read within the
context of the entire Indiana Penal Code. The term "person" is defined as "an
individual who has been born and is alive. '6 7 "Person," conversely, is used in
reference to "a human being, corporation, partnership, unincorporated associa-
tion, or governmental entity." 8 Thus, it appears by the use of the broad term
"person" that the legislature intended to extend criminal responsibility to corpora-
tions under the reckless homicide statute.
In its memorandum in support of a motion to dismiss the indictment, 9 Ford
argued that the restrictive interpretation is the correct view.70 Ford averred that
if the legislature did not intend to limit the scope of the term "person," it would
have simply replaced "another" with "a.' 7' This argument gains support from
the decision in Kelley v. State,72 in which the Indiana Supreme Court stated:
It is a fundamental rule in the construction of statutes that penal
statutes must be construed strictly, or, as is otherwise stated, strictly con-
strued against the state. The rule of strict construction means that statutes
will not be enlarged by implication or intendment beyond the fair meaning
of the language used, and will not be held to include offenses and persons
other than those which are clearly described and provided for although the
court may think the legislature should have made them more compre-
hensive.7 3
65 Id.
66 IND. CODE § 35-42-1-5 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
67 IND. CODE § 35-41-1-2 (Supp. 1978).
68 Id.
69 Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Indictment (filed Dec. 14, 1978).
70 Id. at 46.
71 Id.
72 233 Ind. 294, 119 N.E.2d 322 (1954).
73 Id. at 298, 119 N.E.2d at 324.
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The prosecution countered this argument with the assertion that the phrase
"another human being" was designed to exclude suicide' and abortion 1 from
the definition of homicide. Ford characterized this view as highly dubious, noting
that "reckless suicide" would be an absurdity while the proposition concerning
abortion loses its validity when it is recognized that the use of either "person" or
"human being" could not include abortional killings.7' The prosecution re-
taliated by averring that the use of the broader term "person" rather than
"human being" when describing the actor, suggests that the legislature intended
to extend liability. This position is consistent with Ford's earlier argument that
it must be presumed that the legislature intelligently chose each word of the
statute. Unfortunately, the legislature could not have "intelligently" employed
both terms.
Although these statutory provisions do little to clarify the leglislature's intent,
one additional provision does supply convincing insight. The basis of liability
chapter of the penal code states that: "A corporation ... may be prosecuted for
any offense; it may be convicted of an offense only if it is proved that the offense
was committed by its agent acting within the scope of his authority.' 78 Thus, the
legislature's intent appears to endorse corporate criminal prosecution under the
reckless homicide statute, the use of the traditional homicide language notwith-
standing.
B. Judicial Resolution
The trial judge in the Pinto case found the statutory language that "[a]
corporation... may be prosecuted for any offense" combined with the reasoning
in Ebasco to be compelling. In denying the motion to dismiss, the court con-
curred with the position espoused in Ebasco that there is "no manifest im-
propriety in applying the broader definition of a person to a corporation with
regard to the commission of a homicide."7' 9 This proposition, and the statutory
provision subjecting corporations to prosecution for any offense,8" were held to
be sufficient to withstand Ford's challenge to the propriety of prosecuting corpo-
rations under the reckless homicide statute.
By ruling that corporations can be indicted under the reckless homicide
statute, the trial court has established a significant precedent which, if affirmed,
could have nationwide significance."1 The case provides a basis for interpreting a
74 State's Memorandum at 12 (filed Dec. 1, 1978). This document was filed to oppose the
Motion to Dismiss Indictment.
75 Id. at 11.
76 See Reply Memorandum, supra note 69, at 48. Since "person" definitionally includes
human beings and certain artificial beings, the use of "another human being" does little to
modify the scope of the statute. Abortional killings would not be included if "person" replaced
"human beings" since no component of the term "person" includes a fetus.
77 See Reply Memorandum, supra note 69, at 46.
78 IND. CODE § 35-41-2-3 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
79 Opinion on Motion to Dismiss at 8 (rendered Feb. 1, 1979). This opinion was ren-
lered by Judge Donald Jones of the Indiana Superior Court, Elkhart County.
80 IND. CODE § 35-41-2-3 (Supp. 1978).
81 On February 23, 1979, an Associated Press news release announced that Norfolk &
Western Railway Co. was indicted in Delaware County, Indiana, under the reckless homicide
statute following a fatal automobile accident.
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statutory provision, which generally subjects corporations to criminal prosecu-
tions, as authorizing homicide prosecutions, notwithstanding the use of restrictive
language. Other jurisdictions are likely to employ general criminal provisions to
attack corporate misfeasance and nonfeasance. Although state legislatures could
easily resolve existing ambiguities, the courts are likely to rely heavily on case law
until such ambiguities are eliminated. Hence, corporations may become increas-
ingly vulnerable not only to substantial civil liability, but also to the stigma of a
criminal conviction for the death of human beings."2 Thus, the final issue to be
addressed is the role of corporate criminal liability in modem jurisprudence.
V. Is Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide Necessary or Desirable?
A. The Pros and Cons of Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide
The extension of criminal liability to corporations has stimulated sub-
stantial criticism. The imposition of criminal sanctions on the corporate entity
establishes a form of vicarious liability which has been described as "twice re-
moved" 3 because the ultimate burden of the sanction falls on the shareholders.
Ordinary rules of vicarious liability require the principal's authorization and
consent or knowledge of the agent's act before the former may be held account-
able. 4 Shareholders, however, lack adequate means of control, particularly in
large, publicly held corporations. Accordingly, the propriety of imposing criminal
sanctions on corporations by way of fines is subject to question because those who
bear the burden of the sanction are without power to remedy corporate reckless-
ness. Thus, the opponents of corporate criminal liability maintain that the prac-
tice operates to punish innocent people. Corporate shareholders often have little
control over management or corporate policy. If the goal of the criminal law is
deterrence, then punishing those without the power to alter the allegedly anti-
social conduct does little to attain this end.8"
Conversely, the proponents of criminal liability for corporations aver that
deterrence will result from the convicted corporation bearing the "opprobrium
and incidental disabilities which normally follow a personal conviction."" Also,
a shareholder's loss cannot exceed his equity in the corporation. This protects
the individual shareholder against confiscatory losses. Criminal sanctions in
the form of fines also reduce or eliminate any financial gain accruing to the
corporation from the illegal conduct.
82 Criminal convictions also raise critical issues involving collateral estoppel in subsequent
civil litigation. Although the offensive assertion of collateral estoppel by the plaintiff in civil
litigation based upon the civil defendant's conviction in a prior criminal case is an unresolved
issue in many jurisdictions, future applicaton of such a theory remains a possibility. See gener-
ally Comment, The Conclusiveness of Criminal judgments in Subsequent Civil Cases: An Ex-
panding Role for Collateral Estoppel in Oregon, 11 WILLAmETTE L.J. 176 (1975).
83 Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PxrT. L. REV. 21, 4-2 (1957).
84 LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 6, at 231.
85 Coleman, supra note 15, at 920.
86 Id. Although derivative suits provide a possible means of recovering fines from corporate
directors, indemnification provisions in corporate bylaws often limit their effectiveness. Further-
more, the shareholders are forced to bear the burden of litigation.
87 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 148 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The comments
indicate that the drafters "generally" favor corporate criminal liability, with exceptions.
Whether homicide is an exception is not clear. See text accompanying notes 51-65 supra.
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B. The Case for Corporate Criminal Liability
Before evaluating the concept of criminal liability of corporations, the ulti-
mate goal of criminal sanctions in general must be assessed.' Criminal punish-
ment is generally justified as achieving three desirable effects: deterrence, retribu-
tion, and reformation. The social value of retribution is tenuous, and the con-
cept has been deemphasized in recent years.8" Furthermore, as one commentator
states, "rehabilitation is not generally thought of in connection with corpora-
tions"" especially since fines are the only possible penalty. Therefore, if corpo-
rations are to be held liable for homicide, deterrence becomes the criterion of
analysis.
Since the imposition of corporate criminal liability threatens to expose in-
nocent shareholders to monetary losses, the likelihood of criminal conviction to
deter illegal corporate acts must justify this effect. Thus, corporate criminal
liability must ultimately be evaluated by how well it deters illegal corporate
activity. Realistically, this evaluation cannot be properly conducted in the
abstract. Assessment must be made in light of particular crimes. Thus, corpo-
rate criminal liability for homicide should be assessed in terms of its effectiveness
to deter corporate conduct likely to endanger human life. Moreover, the impact of
liability must be analyzed in terms of the particular sphere of the corporate
milieu producing the illegal act.
In conducting this analysis in the context of the Pinto case, it should be
noted that State v. Ford Motor Co. presents issues which transcend those of
existing precedents. Prior indictments of corporations for homicide resulted
from acts of corporate agents performed within the scope of employment. The
engineer recklessly operating the train or a repairman recklessly installing a gas
pipe, are examples of the norm. The prosecution of Ford, however, occurs in a
completely different setting. Ford's alleged illegal conduct is comprised of three
acts: (1) defectively designing the vehicle, (2) defectively manufacturing the
vehicle, and (3) allowing the vehicle to remain on the public highways.9' Each
of these acts is the product of a complex business decision. Both the design and
manufacture of automobiles are subject to extensive federal regulation. 2 Rigor-
ous testing precedes marketing. Defects discovered after sale to the public may
involve recalls, either voluntary or compulsory.9" Therefore, the Pinto which ex-
ploded on August 10, 1978, was the product of many substantial business decisions
occurring at various levels of the corporate hierarchy. The deterrent effect of
corporate liability for criminal homicide, therefore, must be assessed by the effect
of conviction on this decision-making process.
The maximum penalty which can be imposed on a corporation convicted
under the Indiana reckless homicide statute is a $10,000 fine.94 The effectiveness
88 See generally Coleman, supra note 15, at 919.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Indictment at 1).
92 See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-
1431 (1976).
93 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420 (1976).
94 IND. CODE § 35-50-2-6 (Supp. 1978).
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of this sanction as a deterrent to a large, profitable corporation is questionable.
The imposition of a $10,000 fine in itself is a nominal burden. Opponents of
corporate criminal liability for homicide might contend that companies such as
Ford are not likely to alter internal policies for fear of such sanctions. Thus,
superficially, such indictments appear as futile attempts to impede corporate
recklessness when deterrence is the standard of evaluation and "small" fines are
the sanction.
The inherent flaw in this analysis is the assumption that the $10,000 fine is
the only consequence of conviction. The negative publicity of a criminal con-
viction is the consequence most likely to deter reckless corporate conduct. A
guilty verdict could threaten the fate of a corporation's entire product line by
inspiring public mistrust and thereby jeopardizing future revenues. Short-term
cost reductions due to relaxed concern for safety would have to be discounted by
the potential impact on sales revenue. Therefore, the imposition of corporate
criminal penalties should deter the instigation of corporate policies that produce
incidents such as the Pinto explosion of August 10, 1978, by stimulating greater
managerial scrutiny of the design and manufacture of products.
The Pinto case, regardless of its outcome, will also heighten corporate con-
cern regarding recalls. A product designed and manufactured with proper care
but subsequently found to be defective may be the basis of a homicide indict-
ment. Thus, a new variable enters decisions concerning the recall of defective
products. Simple cost analysis will no longer suffice because the company must
account for potential public animosity in the event of criminal indictment. The
net result is increased concern for product safety and consumer protection.
Arguably, a products liability suit might provide the necessary deterrence
offered by criminal liability. The monetary concern is potentially much greater
and the victim is compensated more directly. Also, the impact on corporate sales
has the potential of being equally devastating. Although this argument has its mer-
its, it fails to note that criminal liability is generally reserved for egregious devia-
tions from the standard of care required of corporations. Furthermore, civil reme-
dies might not be available in all cases," thus leaving criminal prosecution as the
only sanction. The social and moral condemnation associated with a homicide con-
viction also provides an added variable of immense proportions that is not offered
by civil litigation. Media coverage of such events generates national exposure.
The result should be much stronger deterrence of reckless disregard for product
safety.
Absent potential criminal responsibility for marketing a defective product,
the value of human life is reduced to mere cost analysis. Probability distributions
estimating potential consumer deaths and resulting civil liabilities pitted against
the cost of adequate safety precautions threatens to become the standard of
corporate decision-making. Thus, potential criminal liability provides a prophy-
95 This is the case in Indiana. Indiana law does not provide a civil remedy to the families
of the deceased girls. State's Memorandum in Rebuttal to Motion to Dismiss (filed Dec. 20,
1978).
Civil remedies afforded by wrongful death statutes to parents of minor children killed by
defective products are often limited. See generally Decof, Damages in Actions for Wrongful
Death of Children, 47 NOTRE DAME LAw. 197 (1971).
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lactic variable likely to weigh heavily in contemporary decision-making models,
thereby enhancing corporate responsibility to consumers.
VI. Conclusion
The traditional immunity from criminal prosecution offered to corporations
has eroded substantially. Although legislative enactments authorize prosecutions
of corporations for most crimes, the liability of corporations for specific crimes
is ambiguous. Corporate criminal liability for homicide is one such offense.
The ambiguity stems from two factors: the relatively few attempts to indict
corporations for homicide and the adoption of traditional definitions of homicide
in statutes, which lack a clear legislative intent to extend liability to corporations.
The traditional definition requires the killing of one human being by another
human being. The use of "another" preceding "human being" when describing
the victim is said to require an actor of the same class which excludes corpora-
tions since they are not human beings. Courts have adhered to this position
despite the use of broader terms such as "person" to describe the actor.
Most of the ambiguity present in statutory language can be resolved by
substituting "a" for "another" in the homicide statute. 6 State legislatures should
review their homicide statutes to make this correction if they so desire." Since
the issue turns on proper interpretation of legislative intent, the relevant statutes
should be made as explicit as possible. Indeed, proper treatment by the state leg-
islators could settle the question decisively.
Although few courts have dealt with the problem of corporate criminal
liability for homicide, the prevailing trend appears to favor liability. The issue,
however, is unresolved in most jurisdictions. The Pinto case demonstrates the
significance of the issue at stake. The ability to prosecute corporations in this
type of case will influence decision-making at the highest levels of American
industry. Considering the consequences which may result, the issue mandates
firm guidance from state legislatures.
It must be remembered that the imposition of criminal liability for homi-
cide is an additional remedy which should be reserved for exceptional cases. The
option to prosecute supplements the civil process and, in some states, may be the
only practical recourse. Criminal liability is not designed to supplant civil
remedies, but to enhance them. Corporate concern for consumer safety must not
be reduced to mere cost analysis, pitting the risk of injury or fatality against the
cost of producing safe products. By subjecting corporations to criminal liability
for homicide, decision-making can no longer function in this manner. This new
assault introduces a variable into business equations which operates to promote
product safety. Thus, corporate criminal liability for homicide is justified by
its deterrence of reckless disregard for consumer safety.
Glenn A. Clark
96 Since most statutes defining homicide describe the actor as a "person"e and the victim as
a "human being," the use of "a" preceding "human being" would limit the class of victims
while extending the class of actors to include corporations. Abortional killings would be ex-
cluded. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
97 Legislatures should also consider authorizing substantially greater fines. Since corpora-
tions are usually profit motivated, larger monetary sanctions would provide a direct incentive
to fostering product safety.
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